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Although children enact third-party punishment, at least in response to harm and fairness 37 
violations, much remains unknown about this behaviour. We investigated the tendency to make 38 
the punishment fit the crime in terms of moral domain; developmental patterns across moral 39 
domains; the effects of audience and descriptive norm violations; and enjoyment of inflicting 40 
punishment. We tested 5- to 11-year-olds in the UK (N = 152 across two experiments, 55 girls and 41 
97 boys, predominantly white and middle-class). Children acted as referees in a computer game 42 
featuring teams of players: as these players violated fairness or loyalty norms, children were 43 
offered the opportunity to punish them. We measured the type (fining or banning) and severity of 44 
punishment children chose and their enjoyment in doing so. Children only partially made the 45 
punishment fit the crime: they showed no systematic punishment choice preference for disloyal 46 
players, but tended to fine rather than ban players allocating resources unfairly – a result best 47 
explained by equalisation concerns. Children’s punishment severity was not affected by audience 48 
presence or perpetrators’ descriptive norm violations, but was negatively predicted by age (unless 49 
punishment could be used as an equalisation tool). Most children did not enjoy punishing, and 50 
those who believed they allocated real punishment reported no enjoyment more often than children 51 
who believed they pretended to punish. Contrary to predictions, retribution was not a plausible 52 
motive for the observed punishment behaviour. Children are likely to have punished for deterrence 53 
reasons or because they felt they ought to. 54 
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Punishment is a behaviour intended to impose costs upon transgressors of norm violations, and 58 
can come in a wide range of forms: from verbal and physical confrontations to social exclusion 59 
and subtraction of economic resources (Molho, Tybur, Van Lange, & Balliet, 2020). Consequent 60 
costs for the punisher may include decrease in social support, psychological wellbeing and/or 61 
material resources (Adams & Mullen, 2012; van den Berg, Molleman, & Weissing, 2012), or be 62 
essentially absent, in the case of anonymous acts (Klempka & Stimson, 2014). Furthermore, 63 
punishment can be classified depending on whether it targets self- or other-relevant transgressions: 64 
in second-party punishment (2PP) the wrongdoer is punished by the victim of the norm violation, 65 
while in third-party punishment (3PP) the wrongdoer is punished by a bystander to the norm 66 
violation. Whereas the former process is present in other animal species, the latter seems to be 67 
uniquely human (Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012). Unlike second-party punishers, third-68 
party punishers may suffer a cost apparently to the benefit of others (Jensen, 2010). This opens 69 
fascinating and unresolved questions as to how processes of biological or cultural selection could 70 
have favoured the evolution of 3PP (Chudek & Henrich 2011; Wilson & Sober, 1994), and even 71 
discussions as to whether costly 3PP is even a common phenomenon (Guala, 2012; Balafoutas, 72 
Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2014). 73 
This work, however, focuses on the proximate mechanisms of 3PP across development rather 74 
than on its adaptive functions (Tinbergen, 1963). In common with much of the developmental 75 
literature reviewed below, we do not assume that 3PP is by definition costly to the punisher. 76 
Rather, we are interested in the psychological mechanisms involved when children decide to enact 77 
a cost to an individual who has transgressed against a third party, in part independently of the issue 78 
of cost to the child. We now discuss psychological mechanisms that have been identified to be 79 




outlining what is known about children’s 3PP. 81 
Adults assign 3PP to transgressors even in scenarios where there is no chance for the group to 82 
benefit from a potential change in the targets’ behaviour (Crockett, Özdemir, & Fehr, 2014). Not 83 
only do people enact 3PP in one-shot interactions (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002), but during 84 
repeated-interaction experiments they even show higher levels of 3PP in the last rather than first 85 
rounds (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008, as cited by Raihani & Bshary, 2019). This suggests that 86 
people are motivated by retribution, i.e. 3PP for the sake of giving wrongdoers their “just deserts”, 87 
without any further instrumental reason.  88 
Other accounts argue that 3PP has a deterrent motivation to prevent misbehaviours from 89 
occurring to oneself (Delton & Krasnow, 2017; Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016) or 90 
to people the punisher has a welfare stake in, such as kin, friends or in-group members (Ericksen, 91 
& Horton, 1992; Lieberman & Linke, 2007). 3PP could thus be viewed as a bargaining chip in 92 
social exchanges: individuals indeed avoid making punitive efforts to reform uncooperative 93 
behaviour targeting exclusively unknown others (Krasnow, Cosmides, Pedersen, & Tooby, 2012). 94 
Relative payoff concerns can also offer an explanation for third-party punishers’ sensitivity to 95 
inequality. Indeed, people who engage in the costly reduction of payoff differences between group 96 
members, when inequalities are the product of chance, are likely to be the same people who enact 97 
3PP against individuals unwilling to cooperate in the group (Johnson, Dawes, Fowler, McElreath, 98 
& Smirnov, 2009). Furthermore, 3PP of unfairness seems to be motivated more by envy of the 99 
wrongdoer’s higher payoff than by moralistic anger at the experience of the victim of unfairness 100 
(Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013). 101 
Third-party punishers can also accrue social benefits from their intervention via reputational 102 




negative judgements (Pedersen, McAuliffe, & McCullough, 2018). Individuals invest more 104 
resources in enacting 3PP when they are aware their decisions will be communicated to an 105 
audience than when their decisions will remain anonymous (Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien, 2007). 106 
3PP might function as a mechanism to signal punishers’ cooperative qualities, such as 107 
trustworthiness (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), concern about group’s shared values 108 
and social standing of the victim (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011), as well as commitment to 109 
impartiality and fairness (Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Nelissen, 2008). Additionally, 3PP 110 
could also work as a costly signal of formidability to dissuade observers from implementing any 111 
exploitive intentions they might have (Raihani & Bshary, 2015). Thus, 3PP might be akin to a 112 
strategy to assert dominance (Sylwester, Hermann, & Bryson, 2013). 113 
Third-party punishment in childhood 114 
Although behavioural research into 3PP involving adults is well-established, less is known 115 
about such punitive behaviour in children. An appetite for bad things to happen to bad individuals 116 
is present from very early on: 8-month-old infants prefer third parties who punish (instead of 117 
helping) antisocial individuals; 19-month-old toddlers prefer to personally enact 3PP over help 118 
towards antisocial individuals (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan 2011). A desire to punish 119 
wrongdoers is evident even when children are not explicitly encouraged to punish (Kenward & 120 
Östh, 2012) or when imposition of a cost upon transgressors is not framed as punishment (Kenward 121 
& Östh, 2015). Some children engage in 3PP even when they have to pay a social cost (Kenward 122 
& Östh, 2015) or an economic cost (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 123 
2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali, Juda, & Henrich, 2015). Children intervene as third-party 124 
punishers when they observe a range of norm violations involving issues of fairness (Gummerum 125 




Warneken, 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015; Smith & 127 
Warneken, 2016) or harm (Hamlin et al., 2011; Kenward & Östh, 2012, 2015; Van de Vondervoort 128 
& Hamlin, 2018). Types of punishment investigated have mainly consisted of children withholding 129 
or taking away resources from transgressors (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum et al., 2019; 130 
Hamlin et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 131 
2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011; Salali et al., 2015), or inflicting them harm (Kenward & Östh, 132 
2015; Marshall, Gollwitzer, Wynn, & Bloom, 2019). It has been demonstrated that 3PP rates in 133 
children increase in response to modelling (Salali et al., 2015) and with age (Jordan et al., 2014; 134 
McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali et al., 2015), but that 3PP severity decreases with age (Gummerum, 135 
Takezawa & Keller, 2009). There is also indication that gender (Kenward & Östh, 2015), culture 136 
(Robbins & Rochat, 2011) as well as authority and ingroup-outgroup dynamics influence punitive 137 
behaviour (Gummerum et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014; Yudkin, Van Bavel, & Rhodes, 2019). 138 
Moreover, pre-schoolers prefer victim restoration over 3PP of transgressors (Riedl et al., 2015). 139 
There is also some indication that children’s explanations of the reason to intervene as third-party 140 
punishers incorporate deterrent and pedagogical elements (Yudkin et al., 2019). Finally, the 141 
experience of negative emotions does not appear to motivate 3PP decisions in children 142 
(Gummerum et al., 2019).  143 
Current study 144 
In summary, although it has been shown that children do engage in 3PP in experimental 145 
contexts, because of the relative recency of this field, most studies have focussed on establishing 146 
this simple fact and examining relatively straightforward predictors of 3PP such as age, cost and 147 
modelling effects. As such, much remains to be known about the proximate mechanisms that 148 




were designed to investigate the following relevant issues: whether children tend to fit the kind of 150 
punishment to the kind of moral violation in terms of moral domain (Experiments 1-2); whether 151 
they punish violations of descriptive norms (what is commonly done) as well as violations of moral 152 
norms (Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015) (Experiment 1); whether their 3PP responses to 153 
different types of moral violations are affected by age (Experiments 1-2) and the presence of an 154 
audience (Experiment 2); and what affective states they experience in enacting 3PP (Experiment 155 
2). In order to fill these gaps in knowledge, a two-player cooperative spaceship computer game – 156 
called MegaAttack – was developed to be used in experiments with primary school-aged children 157 
(ages 5–11 years). In MegaAttack players belonging to the same team cooperate with one another 158 
against computer-controlled enemies. After having had a chance at playing cooperatively in a team 159 
with the experimenter in a face-to-face interaction (offline playing phase) as game familiarisation, 160 
children changed role from players to referees whose job was to judge supposed internet players’ 161 
behaviour during the game (online refereeing phase). Children policed misbehaviours as 162 
unaffected bystanders, on behalf of the victims, but they were never victims themselves. Children 163 
did not have to pay any economic or social costs to engage in 3PP.  164 
Studies assessing the ecological validity of experimental games employed with adults show 165 
contrasting results: while some studies have found correlational evidence between behaviours in 166 
experimental settings and behaviours in real-world situations (e.g., Benz & Meier, 2008; Gervais, 167 
2017), others have not (e.g., Galizzi & Navarro-Martínez, 2018; Winking & Mizer, 2013). 168 
However, our intent was not to devise an experimental game fully generalisable to contexts outside 169 
the laboratory, but to test hypotheses about children’s punitive preferences (Guala, 2012; Pisor, 170 
Gervais, Purzycki, & Ross, 2019). We specifically wanted to produce causal knowledge about the 171 




controlled conditions that are achievable only in experimental games (Falk & Heckman, 2009). 173 
These methods are not without their limitations. For example, to be able to explore 3PP we framed 174 
our game and defined the set of behavioural choices available to the children in such a way to 175 
maximise the chances that they would respond to norm violations with 3PP (for example by not 176 
requiring children to pay a cost to punish, see Pedersen et al., 2018). However, most of our 177 
hypotheses do not relate to whether children would punish, but rather to details of how they punish. 178 
While we are thus cautious of not conflating (experimental) perceived expectations with (real-life) 179 
internal motivations as drivers of behaviour (List, 2007; Levitt & List, 2007), we also argue that 180 
moderators of elicited punishment behaviour might also be relevant for considering spontaneous 181 
punishment behaviour (similarly to how an experiment on lying can be revealing of mechanisms 182 
of lying even though participants are asked to lie; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leak, 2011). 183 
Experiment 1 184 
Social norm classifications 185 
An important debate about moral norms concerns the contraposition between monism and 186 
pluralism, where the former considers all moral concerns as manifestations of a unique moral 187 
domain (Baumard et al., 2013; Schein & Gray, 2018), while the latter asserts that there is more 188 
than one moral domain. Early pluralist theories (e.g., Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997) 189 
have been built on by theories such as “Moral Foundations Theory”. Moral Foundations Theory 190 
includes five moral foundations: care/harm and fairness/cheating (individualising foundations); 191 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation (binding foundations) (Graham et 192 
al., 2013). Graham and colleagues (2013) have pointed out that research in developmental moral 193 
psychology has hardly begun when it comes to domains other than harm and fairness. 194 




different moral domains and consequent punitive motivations has not been clarified. We propose 196 
two rival hypotheses: general vs specific punishment behaviour motivations. According to the 197 
specific motivation hypothesis, transgressions of different domains lead to different types of 198 
punishment motivation, potentially motivating different types of punishment behaviour (the 199 
“punishment fits the crime” hypothesis, Figure 1A). According to the general motivation 200 
hypothesis, instead, detection of transgressions in different domains leads to a generic sense that a 201 
transgression has occurred and thus different types of transgression activate the same type of 202 
punishment motivation (Figure 1B).  203 
Given the absence of literature on children’s punitive attitudes towards violations apart from 204 
those related to harm and fairness, and the lack of literature comparing children’s punishment of 205 
violations in different domains, we investigated whether children tend to react differently to 206 
different types of moral norm violations. We thus investigated for the first time children’s punitive 207 
responses to violations of what Moral Foundations Theory considers a binding foundation – 208 
loyalty. In order to put the specific motivation hypothesis to the test, we predicted that unfairness 209 
in resource distribution might be more likely to motivate economic punishment, whereas disloyalty 210 
might be more likely to motivate social punishment such as ostracism. We also predicted that this 211 
tendency to match the type of punishment with the type of moral violation would vary with age 212 
because of potential developmental tendencies to cognitive differentiation or integration (Siegler 213 
& Chen, 2008). 214 
Another norm classification approach – proposed by both Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren (1990) 215 
and Bicchieri (2005) – distinguishes between descriptive norms (i.e., what people typically do) 216 
and injunctive norms (i.e., what people think that ought to be done). Based on recent evidence that 217 




might expect them to elicit also punitive sentiments. We thus investigated whether descriptive 219 
norm violations would increase the severity of 3PP allocated for moral norm violations. Results of 220 
this investigation were somewhat inconclusive and further introduction and discussion of the issue 221 
is therefore provided in Supplementary Information (section S4). Because substantial variance in 222 
punishment severity is typically explained by judgements of transgression severity (Alter, 223 
Kernochan, & Darley, 2007), we measured and controlled for transgression severity judgements 224 
when modelling punishment severity. 225 




(C)  (D) 
   
Figure 1. Hypothesised punishment motivations illustrating the relationship between 226 
transgressions in different moral domains and consequent punitive outcomes. A) Specific 227 
motivation hypothesis. B) General motivation hypothesis. C) Associative hypothesis. D) General 228 
motivation plus equalisation hypothesis. 229 
 230 
Age effect on third-party punishment 231 
In the developmental literature the probability of children engaging in 3PP has been shown to 232 
increase with age, across different countries and types of moral scenarios. Specifically, this upward 233 




made during a Triadic Dictator Game. This economic paradigm has been adopted by Jordan, 235 
McAuliffe & Warneken (2014) with US children (age groups: 6 and 8 years of age); by Salali, 236 
Juda & Henrich (2015) with Canadian children (age range: 3 to 8 years of age); and by McAuliffe, 237 
Jordan & Warneken (2015) with US children (age groups: 5 and 6 years of age). Similarly, Smith 238 
& Warneken (2016) demonstrate an increasing tendency in US children between 4 and 10 years 239 
of age to use resource distributions to disadvantage transgressors. By contrast, the Triadic Dictator 240 
Game study conducted by Gummerum et al. (2009) revealed a downward developmental pattern 241 
in punitiveness. Their participants were recruited in Germany, and were both children (age groups: 242 
7 and 11 years of age) and adults (mostly university students). Children proved to be more punitive 243 
third-parties than adults. Notably, in this case punitiveness was operationalised as 3PP severity 244 
rather than 3PP rates. 245 
However, since the majority of the literature about the development of punitiveness indicated 246 
an upward pattern, we predicted we would detect the same in Experiment 1 even though we 247 
measured children’s punitiveness in terms of 3PP severity instead of 3PP rates. Furthermore, 248 
previous studies have never analysed how punitiveness develops across different moral domains, 249 
as they were focused on issues of either unfairness or harm, but never on both at the same time. 250 
Therefore, in order to test the generalisability of those findings, we explored whether the 251 
development of 3PP severity would be affected by the moral domain of the transgressions 252 
(disloyalty vs unfairness) children witnessed. 253 
Method 254 
Materials. The MegaAttack game was programmed in LÖVE, an open-source game 255 
development environment utilising the LUA programming language, and run on a laptop computer 256 




in noisy environments like science fairs. In the test trials, participants saw recordings of games 258 
that they were told were being played live by internet players. The descriptive norm violation was 259 
operationalised as a protective-shield colour-choice made in contrast with what was preferred by 260 
all other player-avatars displayed in the game. The loyalty violation was operationalised as a 261 
refusal to protect a team member who was under deadly attack. The fairness violation was 262 
operationalised as an unfair distribution of game resources (gems). 263 
Sample. Participants were 72 primary school-aged children (mean age: 8.83 years; SD = 1.81 264 
years; age range: from 5.45 years to 11.95 years; 32 females and 40 males) tested in a diverse 265 
range of settings – one museum, one primary school and two science fairs – but the whole testing 266 
phase took place in the same medium-sized English city (from June to October 2017). Power 267 
analyses were not performed because of the lack of previous data on which to base effect size 268 
expectations, so we allowed logistical constraints to determine effect sizes. The study was 269 
approved by the Oxford Brookes University Research Ethics Committee (Study Number 171101, 270 
Children's social judgement in a computer game). 271 
Thirty-five of 72 parents (18 fathers; 15 mothers; 2 unspecified) partially or fully completed a 272 
socio-demographic questionnaire, indicating that Experiment 1’s sample came predominantly 273 
from a middle-class background (the median yearly family income was £60,000; one out of the 35 274 
respondents preferred not to declare) with a high education level (88.57% of the respondents had 275 
at least a Bachelor’s degree), and was heterogeneous in terms of nationality (parents’ nationality: 276 
23 British, 10 non-British, 2 unspecified). Data on racial identity was not systematically collected, 277 
but the sample was predominantly white. 278 
Design. We adopted a 2x2 fully within-subject design in which the factors were descriptivity 279 




(fairness transgression; loyalty transgression), see Table 1. We ran one trial in each condition 281 
combination, with each trial featuring two unique players, one violator and one non-violator. In 282 
the resulting four trials a moral transgression always occurred (either a fairness or loyalty norm 283 
violation), and a descriptive norm violation either did or did not occur, with these variables 284 
counterbalanced. Two irrelevant variables were counterbalanced across participants: the 285 
descriptively normative colour choice (red or blue), and the order of trials. Order with respect to 286 
descriptive norm violation/conformity was AABB or BBAA, and with respect to loyalty/fairness 287 
transgression was ABAB or BABA, counterbalanced (four possible order variants, see 288 
Supplementary Information – Table S1 for details). Each test-trial featured a different pair of 289 
player avatars (different animals inside space-ships). 290 
The dependent variables measured were: judgement of transgression severity (5 ordinal levels: 291 
from “just a little bad” to “super bad”, Figure S1 in Supplementary Information); type of 292 
punishment (2 categorical levels: economic, loss of gems as an in-game resource vs social, banning 293 
from the game, Figure S2 in Supplementary Information); severity of punishment (6 ordinal levels 294 
for both social punishment and economic punishment, ranging from no punishment to 1 day of 295 









Table 1. List of key independent variables for each experiment with details of the levels for 302 
each variable, plus indication of whether the variables were manipulated within- or between-303 
subjects. 304 




norm conformity  
Within-subjects 
Type of moral 





Audience 2 Present; absent Within-subjects 
Punishment opportunity 2 Real; warning; pretend Between-subjects 
 305 
Procedure. The procedure was divided into three phases (see full script in Supplementary 306 
Information – section S1 for further details): (1) Familiarisation, further subdivided into an 307 
offline playing familiarisation and a purportedly online refereeing familiarisation; (2) Four 308 
purportedly online test trials; (3) Final questions. Familiarisation and Final questions were 309 
identical for all participants. 310 
Parents of all children gave informed written consent for them to take part in the experiment. 311 
Children were tested by a single experimenter, seated at a laptop, with any accompanying adults 312 
engaged in other activities (for example filling in the questionnaire). The procedure began with the 313 
experimenter explaining to the children that the experiment consisted of playing offline and 314 
refereeing online a newly devised computer game called MegaAttack.  315 
The playing familiarisation was organised into four short game bouts, aimed at establishing 316 
for the participant that standard moral norms applied to the game, with respect to issues of team 317 
loyalty and fairness in resource distribution. At the beginning, the child and the experimenter were 318 
automatically assigned shields of the same colour (the one that in test trials would be descriptively 319 




shooting robot attackers, and collecting gems that initially went into a communal store but were 321 
manually divided between the players by one of the players at the end of the game bouts.  322 
Each of the four bouts of the playing familiarisation was constituted by a gem collection 323 
stage (45 seconds) followed – from the second bout onwards – by a gem division stage (15 324 
seconds). The first bout had no gem division, for ease of introducing the game; the child decided 325 
how to split the gems at the end of the second bout, and the experimenter split the gems at the end 326 
of the third and fourth bouts. Both times, the experimenter split the gems equally between herself 327 
and the child, thus demonstrating that fair division was normal. A team-loyalty norm was 328 
demonstrated when the experimenter came to the aid of the child when the child’s space-ship was 329 
in danger of being destroyed during a mega-attack, a sudden event in which an overwhelming 330 
number of enemies surrounded and attacked the child’s space-ship at the same time (during the 331 
fourth bout). After the playing familiarisation bouts, the participant was told they were to referee 332 
the game by judging the behaviour of some internet players (the two players represented on the 333 
screen were described as having connected to the game live via the internet, but the games 334 
displayed were actually pre-recorded).  335 
Differently from the bouts in the playing familiarisation, in each bout the child had to referee 336 
(one refereeing familiarisation bout and four test trial bouts) a shield-choice stage (5 seconds) 337 
preceded the gem collection and division stages, in which each player chose either a red or blue 338 
shield. At the beginning of the refereeing familiarisation bout the descriptive norm was 339 
introduced to the child: the experimenter explicitly said that internet players commonly chose a 340 
specific shield colour over another one (red or blue counterbalanced across participants). To 341 
support this claim, the child was invited to pay attention to the shield colour used by 28 additional 342 




waiting to play. In the refereeing familiarisation bout no norms were violated by the two players: 344 
both players chose the common over the uncommon shield colour and both players were loyal and 345 
fair to each other. For this reason the child was expected to conclude that no misbehaviours had 346 
occurred.  347 
The refereeing familiarisation was followed by four test trials (each one game bout) in which 348 
the child saw a combination of descriptive and moral norm-violations (as outlined above in the 349 
section dedicated to the experimental design) and heard the narration of such actions from a live-350 
streamer (commentator) presented as live but actually pre-recorded (note that live internet-game 351 
commentary is now a common phenomenon that many children are familiar with; Sjöblom & 352 
Hamari, 2017). Two different male voice-overs were used, counterbalanced across participants. 353 
Children were expected to easily identify both the descriptive violations and the moral 354 
misbehaviours committed by the players since the voice-over made them particularly salient. 355 
Specifically, Descriptive norm-violations happened when one of the players chose for themselves 356 
an uncommon shield colour (Figure 2A). Loyalty norm-violations happened when one of the 357 
players refused to come to the aid of the team-mate during enemies’ mega-attacks, resulting in the 358 
team-mate’s space-ship’s destruction (Figure 2B). Fairness norm-violations happened when one 359 
of the players took for themselves all but two gems (typically the team managed to collect about 360 
20 gems per bout prior to the division) (Figure 2C).  361 
After each of the five internet scenarios shown (1 refereeing familiarisation plus 4 test trials), 362 
in a refereeing stage the child answered for each of the two players in turn: “Did they do anything 363 
wrong?”. If a misbehaviour was identified, the child had to judge the severity of the norm-364 
transgression (“How bad was the player’s behaviour?”) using the 5-point smiley face scale (Figure 365 




or economic type of punishment (“Now you can give a time-out from the game to the mean player 367 
– so that they wouldn’t be allowed to play for a while – or you can take away some of their gems. 368 
Which kind of penalty do you want to give the mean player?). Finally, the child was asked to 369 
establish the severity of the punishment (for social punishment: “How long do you want the time 370 
out to be?”; for economic punishment: “How many gems do you want the mean player to lose?”, 371 
Figure 2D). Each punishment choice and consequence was accompanied by audio-visual effects, 372 
and each punishment choice was made by computer key press, to give the child the impression 373 
they were genuinely acting as referee.  374 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked whether they thought it was worse for a 375 
transgressor to receive a social or an economic type of punishment, and whether they believed they 376 












Figure 2. Different stages of Experiment 1 game bouts. (A) Shield-choice stage: player Ostrich 378 
makes a descriptively non-normative choice. (B) Gem-collection stage: player Fox is under deadly 379 
threat from a Mega-attack, as disloyal player Panda ignores the situation and continues to collect 380 
gems. (C) Gem-division stage: unfair player Wolf is about to take more than their share. (D) 381 
Refereeing stage: player Beaver is about to be fined 50 gems by the participant. 382 
 383 
Analysis Strategy and Statistics. Linear mixed-effects models were used to examine 3PP 384 
developmental patterns across moral domains and the effect of descriptive violations on 3PP 385 
severity and judgement of transgression severity, with Participants’ ID included as a random factor 386 
because there were multiple data points per individual. All other IVs were included as fixed factors. 387 
Model fits were confirmed by examining diagnostic scatter plots of residuals. All analyses were 388 
conducted in the R programming environment (Version 3.6.3, R Core Team, 2020) with raw data 389 
and code available in Supplementary Information.  390 
Results & Discussion 391 
Preliminary analyses 392 
Believability of the game. The majority of children (67 out of 72) expressed a belief about 393 
whether they had refereed real games. Only 37 out of these 67 children (55%) believed they had 394 
done so, implying that some children detected the deception involved. Nevertheless, there was no 395 
effect of believability on the key variables (i.e., punishment severity in Table 2; judgement of 396 
transgression severity and punishment type in Supplementary Information – section S4.4). 397 
Therefore, for the statistical analyses data is included irrespective of believability. 398 
Punishment rate. In 279 out of the total 288 times a moral transgression was shown, children 399 
correctly recognised the violators and consequently punished them (punishment rate: 97%). 400 
Misidentification of non-violators as violators were made by 13 children, in the refereeing 401 





Main analyses 404 
Choice of punishment types. We calculated the proportion of trials for which a punishment 405 
type was chosen in the same domain as the norm violation (i.e., economic punishment for fairness 406 
transgressions or social punishment for loyalty transgressions) to verify whether children assigned 407 
punishment types randomly or not. With only two trials in each moral domain, this proportion can 408 
only take three values (0, .5, and 1). Non-parametric analysis is therefore appropriate, so we 409 
bootstrapped (100,000 samples) confidence intervals for the proportions, along with p-values for 410 
the one-sample comparison against the null-hypothesis value of .5. For unfairness, the punishment 411 
matched the domain in 69% of trials, 95% CI [61%, 78%], p < .001, whereas for disloyalty the 412 
punishment matched the domain in 59% of trials which was not significant, 95% CI [50%, 69%], 413 
p = .062. 414 
In order to investigate the effects of age on the tendency to make the punishment fit the crime, 415 
we also calculated an overall “Punishment Fits The Crime” (PFTC) score, as the mean of the two 416 
aforementioned proportions (i.e., proportion of unfairness trials sanctioned with economic 417 
punishment, and proportion of disloyalty trials sanctioned with social punishment) for each 418 
individual. This score did not change as a function of age, F(1,70) = 1.05, p = .309, R2 = .01, in 419 
contrast with our prediction.  420 
There was apparently no confound between punishment type and believed punishment severity: 421 
20 children considered economic punishment most severe, whereas 22 considered social 422 
punishment most severe, χ2 (1) = 0.10, p = .758; 25 children rated social and economic punishment 423 
as equally severe, while the remaining 2 gave no clear answer. 424 
Children clearly made the punishment fit the crime by assigning economic costs for economic 425 




is entirely unrelated to transgression type (Figure 1B). However, there was no clear evidence for 427 
such a tendency for social transgressions, for which the higher level of social punishment did not 428 
reach significance. Strong support for the specific motivation hypothesis, according to which 429 
specific transgressions motivate specific punishments across domains (Figure 1A), is therefore 430 
also lacking. Post-hoc, we considered potential explanations for this unexpected result. For 431 
economic unfairness children might have been primed to select a form of punishment employing 432 
gems simply because gems played a salient role in the unfair scenario (associative hypothesis; 433 
Figure 1C). Alternatively, children’s 3PP behaviour might have been additionally motivated by 434 
inequality aversion, with economic costs imposed not only to punish but also to correct unjust 435 
resource distributions (general motivation plus equalisation hypothesis; Figure 1D). Children of 436 
this age are indeed averse to economic inequality in third-party contexts (Shaw & Olson, 2012). 437 
The obtained results are consistent with both the associative hypothesis and the general motivation 438 
plus equalisation hypothesis because they both postulate a specific mechanism, related to gems, 439 
that causes the punishment to fit the crime for economic but not social transgressions. To 440 
distinguish these possibilities a follow-up experiment was designed (see Experiment 2). 441 
Developmental pattern of punishment severity across moral domains. Linear mixed-442 
effects analyses revealed that children’s 3PP severity was predicted by age, moral domain of the 443 
transgression and the interaction between age and domain, while controlling for judgements of 444 
transgression severity (Table 2). Specifically, acts of unfairness were punished more severely (M 445 
= 4.44, SD = 1.09) than acts of disloyalty (M = 4.23, SD = 1.23). On average, younger children 446 
were more punitive than older children. However, this downward developmental pattern occurred 447 
only in cases of disloyalty, whereas 3PP severity remained stable across ages in cases of unfairness 448 




development and are discussed after a replication attempt in Experiment 2. 450 
Table 2. Modulating factors of punishment severity in Experiment 1. 451 
Factor b β 95% CI for β χ2 p 
Judgement of transgression severity -.30 -.28 -.39, -.17 22.29 < .001 *** 
Age -.21 -.33 -.51, -.15 13.06 .001 *** 
Gender .13 .11 -.20, .43 0.49 .483 
Believability .08 .07 -.24, .38 0.20 .654 
Moral domain .19 .17 .00, .33 9.86 .007 ** 
Descriptivity .03 .03 -.14, .19 0.10 .748 
Age x Moral domain .14 .21 .04, .38 6.09 .014 * 
 452 
Note: * p ≤ .050.   ** p ≤ .010.   *** p ≤ .001. For binary variables, the following categories are coded as 453 
1 (and the others as 0): gender male, believed to be real, domain of unfairness, and descriptively uncommon 454 
choice. Raw model coefficients b are standardised to produce β and associated 95% confidence interval by 455 
normalising by standard deviation of the dependent variable in all cases and by the standard deviation of 456 
the predicting factor only when it is not categorical (age and judgement of transgression severity), meaning 457 





Figure 3. Developmental pattern of punishment severity across moral domains (disloyalty vs 460 
unfairness) in Experiment 1, with reference to judgement of transgression severity. 95% CI 461 
of the regression line is shown. 462 
 463 
Effects of descriptive norm violations. As shown in Table 2, descriptivity was not a 464 
predictor of 3PP severity, and the effect size confidence intervals indicate that any undetected 465 




Information (sections S4.4 and S6.1). 467 
Experiment 2 468 
Experiment 2 was intended to resolve the uncertainty regarding the reasons for choice of 469 
punishment types in Experiment 1; to verify whether the developmental patterns of 3PP severity 470 
were replicable; and to investigate two new issues: potential audience effects, and children’s 471 
enjoyment of enactment of punishment.  472 
Why did the punishment fit the crime for unfairness only? 473 
Experiment 1 demonstrated economic punishment to be preferentially allocated in response to 474 
unfairness, but did not find clear evidence that social transgressions were matched with social 475 
punishment. This was most consistent with neither of the two originally proposed hypotheses, but 476 
rather with an associative explanation, or a general punishment motivation in which equalisation 477 
motives also influence behaviour (Table 3). To distinguish between these new alternative 478 
hypotheses, the transgressions were modified so that gems were made salient in the disloyal rather 479 
than in the unfair scenario, while punishment types remained unchanged (an economic punishment 480 
of a gem fine, or a social punishment of a ban). Because gems were now associated with loyalty 481 
rather than fairness transgressions, the associative hypothesis predicts that the economic 482 
punishment of a gem fine would now be associated with loyalty rather than fairness transgressions. 483 
In contrast, the general motivation plus equalisation hypothesis predicts no preference for either 484 
type of punishment in either condition, since the unfairness now concerned a different resource 485 





Table 3. Predicted punishment preference results for each condition according to different 488 
hypotheses, plus observed results. 489 













































































































Notes:  490 
a Because economic punishment (fining of gems) can help to equalise the unfair distribution of gems that 491 
motivates the punishment. 492 
b Because economic punishment (fining of gems) could be primed by the featuring of gems in the 493 
transgression (unfair gem distribution). 494 
c Because economic punishment (fining of gems) could be primed by the featuring of gems in the 495 
transgression (betrayal at the mega-gem). 496 
 497 
Audience effects on moral behaviour and judgements 498 
Audience effects – namely, behavioural changes induced by the presence of an audience or cues 499 




& Bering, 2008). We therefore manipulated a collection of audience cues – presence or absence 501 
of a commentator and other players observing over the internet, and the attention of the 502 
experimenter – with the prediction that children would enact more severe 3PP against norm 503 
violators, and express more severe judgments about transgressions, in the Audience condition. 504 
Results of this investigation were somewhat inconclusive and further introduction and discussion 505 
of the issue is therefore provided in Supplementary Information (section S5). 506 
Affective states involved in punishment 507 
3PP is typically associated with negative emotions such as moral outrage and anger in response 508 
to transgressions. However, although the experience of negative emotions appears to motivate 3PP 509 
decisions in adults (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-510 
Pérez, 2016; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011), evidence suggests this is not the 511 
case in children or adolescents (Gummerum et al., 2019). Whereas these studies have investigated 512 
the emotional antecedents to 3PP, the understanding of the emotional consequences of carrying 513 
out an act of 3PP is still incomplete. To our knowledge there are no studies of young children on 514 
this topic, and the only experimental evidence of affective correlates with 3PP in the adult literature 515 
has produced rather mixed results.  516 
Neuroscientific studies employing dictator game and fMRI methodology have suggested that 517 
enacting 3PP is intrinsically rewarding for adult punishers. For example, after a dictator proposed 518 
an unfair offer, both second- and third-party punishers of the dictator showed stronger activation 519 
in the striatum (a brain area implicated in reward) in comparison to people who decided not to 520 
punish, although such activation was stronger in second-party punishers than in third-party 521 
punishers (Strobel et al., 2011).  522 




straightforwardly reconcilable with this, however. Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert (2008) carried out 524 
a public goods game where a pool of participants were informed they had all been victims of the 525 
uncooperative behaviour of a single free rider (2PP and 3PP were confounded). Punishing did have 526 
an effect on people’s feelings, but in the opposite direction to expected: punishers felt worse than 527 
people who had not been given a possibility to punish. Those who simply forecasted how 528 
punishment would feel if they did punish anticipated feeling better than punishers actually did. 529 
Finally, 10 minutes after the game, punishers reported ruminating about the free rider significantly 530 
more than non-punishers.  531 
Following Carlsmith et al.’s (2008) findings that revenge is not as “sweet” as commonly 532 
believed, experimental efforts focused on the conditions in which 2PP could be satisfying. In an 533 
experiment analysing avengers’ satisfaction in relation to the reaction of the punished wrongdoer, 534 
it was found that avengers seeing a wrongdoer suffer had comparable satisfaction levels to those 535 
who decided not to punish the wrongdoer. Further, punishers who saw the wrongdoer evidence 536 
understanding and contrition in response to punishment experienced an increase in satisfaction 537 
(Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). 538 
Regarding potential punishment motivations, it has been theorised that deterrence-motivated 539 
people employ punishment to teach a lesson to wrongdoers in order to deter future norm violations 540 
(forward-looking motivation), whereas retribution-motivated people use punishment because they 541 
derive, or at least expect to derive, satisfaction from inflicting damage to wrongdoers (backward-542 
looking motivation). To provide experimental support for these conceptualisations, Crockett et al. 543 
(2014) allowed participants to pay an economic cost to sanction wrongdoers in two conditions: an 544 
open punishment condition in which wrongdoers learned that they had been punished for their 545 




the wrongdoer was made to believe their resource loss was due to chance rather than punishment, 547 
argued to elicit retribution motivations. Participants in the hidden punishment condition sanctioned 548 
the wrongdoer almost as frequently as in the open punishment condition. Thus, people experience 549 
satisfaction from enacting costly punishment even when there is no possibility that by punishing 550 
they could teach somebody a lesson. When asked to report their motivations to punish, people’s 551 
explanations did not correspond with their behaviour as their endorsement of deterrence 552 
motivations far exceeded that of retribution motivations (Carlsmith et al., 2002). 553 
Drawing on the experimental designs employed by Carlsmith et al. (2008), Gollwitzer et al. 554 
(2011) and Funk et al. (2014), we compared reported enjoyment levels when children were 555 
informed that they were really punishing transgressors (real punishment condition) or that they 556 
were simply sending a warning (warning condition) or that they were pretending to punish (pretend 557 
condition). Although the adult literature about punishment-related affective states is equivocal, we 558 
predicted that children would enjoy enacting punishment, as vengeance-driven retribution 559 
(Crockett et al., 2014) seems a more plausible motivation for their punishment, given that 560 
deterrence is a more cognitively demanding forward-looking motivation, and in adolescents 3PP 561 
has in fact been linked to positive affect (Hao, Yang, & Wang, 2016). Specifically, we 562 
hypothesised that children who believed they allocated actual punishment would report higher 563 
enjoyment than children who believed they were just pretending to punish. Intermediate levels of 564 
enjoyment were instead predicted for children who believed they sent warning messages to 565 
misbehaving players. 566 
Method 567 
Sample. Participants were 80 primary school-aged children (mean age: 7.91 years; SD = 1.62 568 




range of settings (two primary schools, three science fairs and at lab visits), but the whole testing 570 
phase took place in the same city as in Experiment 1, from December 2017 to April 2018. Power 571 
analyses were not performed because of the lack of previous data on which to base effect size 572 
expectations for the novel hypotheses, so we allowed logistical constraints to determine effect 573 
sizes.  574 
Forty-three out of 80 caregivers (18 fathers; 20 mothers; 5 grandmothers) partially or fully 575 
completed a socio-demographic questionnaire, indicating that Experiment 2’s sample came mostly 576 
from a middle-class background (the median yearly family income was £70,000; 3 out of 43 577 
respondents preferred not to declare) with a high education level (84% of the respondents had at 578 
least a Bachelor’s degree), and was predominantly British (caregivers’ nationality: 38 British, 5 579 
non-British). Data on racial identity was not systematically collected, but the sample was 580 
predominantly white. 581 
Design. We adopted a 2x2x3 mixed design in which the factors were: type of moral 582 
transgression (2 within-subject levels: fairness transgression; loyalty transgression); audience (2 583 
within-subject levels: present; absent); punishment opportunity (3 between-subject levels: real; 584 
warning; pretend), see Table 1. 585 
We ran one trial in each of the within-subject factor combinations, for a total of four test trials. 586 
Counterbalancing was as for Experiment 1, but with audience presence or absence manipulated in 587 
place of descriptive-norm violation or conformity (see Supplementary Information – Table S3). 588 
The dependent variables measured were: judgement of transgression severity (6 ordinal levels 589 
from “very bad” to “neither bad nor good”, Figure S4 in Supplementary Information); type of 590 
punishment (3 categorical levels: gem fine, a ban, or neither of them, differently from Experiment 591 




enacting punishment (11 ordinal levels from “very bad” to “very good”, Figure S4 in 593 
Supplementary Information). 594 
 595 
Figure 4. Types of punishment in Experiment 2. Punishment severity options are the same as 596 
the ones used for Experiment 1. As a consequence, children have two possibilities to express their 597 
desire not to punish the transgressor: when they are asked to choose the type of punishment, they 598 
can select “Neither”. Should they choose either “Time out” or “Lose gems”, they can then select 599 
the no-punishment option (respectively, 0 minutes or 0 gems). 600 
 601 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 closely resembled that of Experiment 1, thus this 602 
section describes only differences. There was no shield-choice stage and all players were 603 
automatically assigned blue shields. Game bouts still contained a gem collection stage and a 604 
resource division stage, but rather than a gem division stage after the gem collection stage, there 605 
was a bomb division stage before the gem collection stage. During the collection stage, two types 606 
of gems could appear: normal sized-gems (like in Experiment 1) and mega-gems each containing 607 
8 normal sized-gems. The collection of the mega-gem was a cooperative task inspired by the string-608 
pulling task (see e.g. Marshall-Pescini, Basin, & Range, 2018). For the mega-gem to be collected, 609 
both players had to attach to it. If instead only one player attached to the mega-gem, they would 610 




familiarisation, a loyalty norm was illustrated when the experimenter, once the child had attached 612 
to the mega-gem, cooperated with them by attaching to it too (during the third and fourth bout). 613 
There were no mega-attacks. 614 
In the four test trials the live-stream commentator was now also visible as a thumbnail on the 615 
screen, to emphasise that the game was observed (Figure 5A). Loyalty violations happened when 616 
one of the players refused to cooperate with the team-mate in the mega-gem collection, thus 617 
leaving the team-mate trapped on the mega-gem, incapable of defending themselves from enemies’ 618 
attacks (Figure 5A). Fairness violations happened when one of the players took for themselves 619 
more bombs than an equal share (8/10 or 9/10 in the two trials).  620 
According to the punishment-opportunity condition children were assigned to, the purpose of 621 
the refereeing activity was framed differently in the punishment stage. Children were told they 622 
could: enact real punishment against the wrongdoers; or warn wrongdoers about possible future 623 
punishment; or just pretend to allocate punishment (see script in Supplementary Information – 624 
section S3.5 for further details about the framing). 625 
Regarding the audience manipulation in the test trials, a range of different cues of observation 626 
were included. In the Audience condition the frame outside the game arena was full of player 627 
avatars, with animations indicating attention paid to what was happening in the arena, including 628 
the refereeing. Moreover, the stage in which the child could judge and punish the transgressors 629 
was introduced by the live-streamer with comments such as: “Let’s watch the referee making their 630 
decision” or “Let’s see what the referee thinks”. Notably, the live-streamer remained in sight 631 
during the whole judgement/punishment phase, with the gaze directed at the refereeing child. Also, 632 
the experimenter appeared concentrated on the child’s decisions. Instead, in the No Audience 633 




streamer, once finished commenting on the transgressions, disappeared from the screen either 635 
because of a fake internet connection problem or by pretending to move away from his computer 636 
after being called by someone, and thus could not have observed the punishment choices (Figure 637 
5B). In order to further minimise observability cues, also the experimenter looked away from the 638 
screen, pretending to write something on a piece of paper.  639 
At the end of the experiment, each child was questioned about the affective states they 640 
experienced while playing (“How has it been playing the game with me?”) and punishing (“So 641 
when you chose time-out or losing gems, how did it make you feel?”) by making reference to the 642 
11-point smiley face scale, the same that participants had to use to evaluate players’ transgression 643 
severity. As well as the same believability check question as previously put in Experiment 1, we 644 
also verified whether children remembered the punishment-opportunity condition they had been 645 
assigned to (real punishment; warning about future punishment; pretend punishment) by 646 
describing each and asking which applied. Finally, for exploratory purposes we asked the children 647 
whether they regretted their punishment decisions, whether they would make the same decisions 648 
and, if not, what they would do differently.  649 
(A)               (B) 650 
  
Figure 5. Experiment 2 game bouts stages with differences to Experiment 1. (A) Gem-651 
collection stage: player Badger is stuck on the Mega-gem and taking damage from enemies, as 652 
disloyal player Beaver refuses to release them by also attaching to the Mega-gem to collect the 653 




consent for the child’s likenesses to be published in this article. (B) Referee stage: the participant 655 
is about to assign a 20-minute ban to player Lion, in the No Audience condition – there are no 656 
observing player-avatars and the live-streamer has just left.  657 
 658 
 659 
Results & Discussion 660 
Preliminary analyses 661 
Believability of the game. Possibly because an apparently real live-streamer was now present 662 
on screen, commenting the players’ actions, believability apparently increased: all but one of the 663 
80 children expressed clear beliefs, with 53 out of the 79 children (67%) believing they had 664 
refereed actual internet players during the test trials. As in Experiment 1, there was no effect of 665 
believability on the key variables (i.e., punishment severity in Table 4; judgement of transgression 666 
severity, punishment type and punishment enjoyment in Supplementary Information – section 667 
S5.4), therefore for the statistical analyses data is included regardless of believability. 668 
Punishment opportunity manipulation check. The percentage of participants that 669 
correctly remembered the outcome of their punishment-related choices on the transgressors was 670 
67% among children informed they were really punishing, 89% among children informed they 671 
were warning players about future punishment, and 81% among those informed they were 672 
pretending to punish.  673 
Punishment rate. When actual transgressions were shown, in 304 out of 320 test trials (95%) 674 
children correctly identified the violators. Of these 304 trials, children chose not to punish in only 675 
27 cases, therefore the punishment rate in Experiment 2 remained high (87%). Misidentifications 676 
of non-violators as violators were made by 2 children in the refereeing familiarisation (in one trial 677 






Main analyses 681 
Choice of punishment types. The analysis was the same as that in Experiment 1, with 682 
proportions of trials with the punishment domain fitting the transgression domain calculated. For 683 
unfairness, the punishment domain matched the transgression domain in 51% of trials, 95% CI 684 
[42%, 60%], p = .941, and in disloyalty trials, the punishment domain matched the transgression 685 
domain in 42% of trials, 95% CI [33%, 50%], p = .057 – in other words there was no significant 686 
relations between transgression and punishment domains.  687 
We have seen that the results of Experiment 1 were not fully in accordance with either the 688 
general or specific motivation hypotheses. The lack of a significant association between gem-689 
related disloyalty and gem fines in Experiment 2 also runs counter to the associative model, 690 
according to which the preference would be for punishment that is connected to salient but 691 
superficial features of the transgression. Thus, the combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 render 692 
the general motivation plus equalisation hypothesis most plausible (Table 3). This suggests that 693 
children’s motive to enact 3PP is not specifically related to the moral domain of the transgression; 694 
however their punishment behaviour is further modified by resource equalisation concerns. These 695 
concerns seem to lead children to select the type of punishment allowing them not only to impose 696 
a cost on the transgressor but also to equalise – when possible – the resource imbalance between 697 
the victim and transgressor. Further research will be needed, however, to confidently discard the 698 
associative model, as well as to investigate other potential cognitive mechanisms guiding 699 
children’s choices in terms of punishment types.  700 
Finally, in order to investigate the effects of age on the tendency to make the punishment fit the 701 
crime, we calculated again an overall “Punishment Fits The Crime” (PFTC) score, defined as in 702 




proportion of disloyalty trials punished socially. This score did not change as a function of age 704 
F(1,75) = 0.01, p = .906, R2 < .001, confirming the result of Experiment 1.  705 
Developmental pattern of punishment severity across moral domains. Linear-mixed 706 
effects analyses revealed that children’s 3PP severity was significantly predicted by age, but not 707 
by moral domain or by the interaction between age and domain, while controlling for judgements 708 
of transgression severity (Table 4). Therefore, in contrast with Experiment 1, where 3PP severity 709 
decreased with age only for cases of disloyalty, 3PP severity decreased with increasing age in cases 710 
of unfairness and disloyalty alike. Moreover, 3PP severity for acts of disloyalty (M = 4.47, SD = 711 
1.34) was comparable to that for acts of unfairness (M = 4.31, SD = 1.44), see Figure 6. 712 
The majority of previous literature focussed on children’s 3PP rates (i.e., probability to engage 713 
vs not engage in punishment) instead of 3PP severity, and showed that 3PP rates increase rather 714 
than decrease with age (Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali et al., 2015). Therefore, 715 
the finding that, unless punishment can be used as an equalisation tool (see more detailed 716 
explanation in the General Discussion), 3PP severity is negatively predicted by age was somewhat 717 
unexpected. It is thus plausible that 3PP rates and severity are governed by different cognitive 718 
underpinnings, following different developmental patterns. However, this remains a speculative 719 
hypothesis that will need further research as the present experimental paradigm had not been 720 
designed to investigate differences between 3PP rates and severity in detail.  721 
Although the finding that 3PP severity decreases with age had not been anticipated, it is 722 
consistent with research highlighting that children and adolescents are more severe third-party 723 
punishers than adults (Gummerum et al., 2009; Hao et al., 2016). Hao et al. suggested that 724 
decreases in 3PP severity are linked to emotional development, and in line with this we propose 725 




of emotion experience. Indeed, self-reported emotion ratings and activity of brain regions such as 727 
amygdala, posterior cingulate and mPFC have both been found to be associated with the severity 728 
of punishment allocated to the transgressor in adults (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012). Other 729 
explanations for this development remain plausible and further work is necessary to investigate 730 
how developing affective and cognitive processes influence children’s developing 3PP behaviour.  731 
Table 4. Modulating factors of punishment severity in Experiment 2. 732 
Factor b β 95% CI for β χ2 p 
Judgement of transgression severity -.25 -.24 -.34, -.13 18.49 <.001 *** 
Age -.24 -.27 -.44, -.10 20.95 <.001 *** 
Gender .47 .34 -.01, .68 3.61 .057 
Believability -.38 -.27 -.60, .05 2.71 .100 
Moral domain -.01 -.01 -.17, .15 3.25 .197 
Audience .07 .05 -.11, .21 0.33 .563 
Age x Moral domain -.13 -.15 -.31, .01 3.24 .072 
Punishment opportunity    1.30 .521 
   Actual vs. pretend punishment -.07 -.05 -.43, .33   
   Warning vs. pretend punishment .22 .16 -.22, .54   
Note: * p ≤ .050.   ** p ≤ .010.   *** p ≤ .001. Category coding, unstandardised (b) and standardised (β) 733 
regression coefficients with associated 95% confidence interval are the same as for Table 2, with the 734 





Figure 6. Developmental pattern of punishment severity across moral domains (disloyalty vs 737 
unfairness) in Experiment 2, with reference to judgement of transgression severity. 95% CI 738 
of the regression line is shown. 739 
 740 
Audience effects on moral behaviour and judgements. Children’s 3PP severity was not 741 
affected by audience presence (Table 4). This null result (with confidence interval indicating any 742 
undetected effect is small) is in contrast with findings of Kurzban et al. (2007), and Piazza & 743 




their reputation was at stake. However, our audience manipulation proved to be effective in 745 
modifying children’s judgements of transgression severity – see Supplementary Information 746 
(section S5.4) for further details of these results. 747 
Affective states involved in punishment. On average children did not much enjoy making 748 
punishment-related decisions: across conditions M = 0.13, SD = 2.51, which is not significantly 749 
different from 0, t(75) = 0.46, p = .648, d = 0.05, 95% CI for d [-0.17, 0.27] (Figure 7). There was 750 
an association between punishment condition (real; warning; pretend) and whether the participants 751 
enjoyed punishment (enjoyment score > 0) or not (enjoyment score ≤ 0), χ2 (2, N = 76) = 7.32, p 752 
= .026. Specifically, the percentage of participants that reported no enjoyment was 85% (95% CI 753 
[65%, 96%]) among children who believed they were really punishing, 58% (95% CI [37%, 77%]) 754 
among children who believed they were warning players about future punishment, and 50% (95% 755 
CI [29%, 71%]) among those who believed they were pretending to punish. Post-hoc paired 756 
comparisons (Fisher’s exact tests) revealed that only the difference between real punishment and 757 
pretend punishment was significant (p = .044). Warning about future punishment produced a level 758 
of enjoyment intermediate between real punishment and pretend punishment, though not 759 
significantly different to either (warning-real punishment, p = .097; warning-pretend punishment, 760 
p = .777). The lack of enjoyment is unlikely to be related to idiosyncratic properties of the 761 
enjoyment scale: 95% of children reported enjoying playing the game, mean enjoyment = 4.04, 762 
SD = 1.34. Notably, the majority of children reported that they did not regret their punishment 763 
decisions (82%) and that would make the same choices again (75%). These proportions did not 764 
change depending on whether children enjoyed or did not enjoy punishment: respectively, χ2 (2, 765 
N = 76) = .00, p = .987, and χ2 (2, N = 76) = .17, p = .678. Among the children who declared that 766 




intentions (n = 8) were reported at a similar frequency than more punitive intentions (n = 6). 768 
 769 
Figure 7. Experiment 2 punishment enjoyment by punishment opportunity condition: real; 770 
warning; pretend. Violin plots wrapping boxplots; boxplots showing median and interquartile 771 
range, outliers, and a large dot for mean value. 772 
 773 
Our result accords with Carlsmith et al.’s (2008) finding that punishing potentially has a 774 
negative impact on affective states, extending this result from adults (tested in a public goods 775 
game) to children (in a 3PP paradigm). Specifically, in Carlsmith et al.’s experiment punishers of 776 
free riders experienced more negative affective states than non-punishers. Furthermore, our result 777 
that lack of enjoyment was more frequent among children who believed they had allocated real 778 
over pretend punishment was particularly surprising in the light of the adolescence literature: Hao 779 
et al. (2016) found that adolescents associate 3PP with positive rather than negative affect. This 780 
lack of punishment enjoyment, accompanied by lack of regret, detected in Experiment 2 suggests 781 




done although it is not enjoyable. Retribution is therefore not an adequate primary explanation for 783 
the observed 3PP behaviour. In this context, it is difficult to distinguish between demand 784 
characteristics of the situation (referees are expected to punish) or deterrence motives for 785 
punishment. However, the current result suggests that especially in contexts where children punish 786 
without explicit demand characteristics (e.g., Kenward & Östh, 2015), deterrence is a more 787 
plausible motive for children’s 3PP than retribution. The extent to which children’s 3PP is 788 
motivated by implicit demand characteristics, for example a belief that adults in general approve 789 
of punishment, is an open question. 790 
General Discussion 791 
Our investigation has shed light on children’s 3PP by making use of an innovative and 792 
sophisticated computerised paradigm that simplified the manipulation of numerous variables 793 
embedded in a real game. In this way, we tested hypotheses of 3PP motivations, and examined the 794 
affective consequences of engaging in 3PP as well as the potential moderators of 3PP such as 795 
descriptive-to-injunctive inferences, age and audience presence.  796 
Regarding the effect of age on 3PP, previous literature demonstrated that the odds of engaging 797 
in 3PP increased between the ages of 3 and 10 (Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015; Salali 798 
et al., 2015). With respect to 3PP severity, however, Gummerum et al. (2009) and Hao et al. (2016) 799 
found that children and adolescents were more severe punishers than adults. This is consistent with 800 
the decrease in 3PP severity between the ages of 5 and 11 we observed in both disloyalty and 801 
unfairness trials of Experiments 2, and in disloyalty (but not unfairness) trials of Experiment 1. If 802 
it is indeed generally the case that rate of 3PP increases with age but 3PP severity decreases, then 803 
it is likely that 3PP rates and severity follow distinct developmental trajectories with different 804 




Moreover, our research has been the first attempt to experimentally verify whether children 806 
tend to make the punishment fit the crime in terms of moral domains. To do so we employed, 807 
across Experiments 1-2, two punishment types (social vs economic punishment) and four moral 808 
scenarios, two for each domain (unfairness: distribution of gems and distribution of bombs; 809 
disloyalty: rescue of the team-member during a mega-attack and cooperative collection of the 810 
mega-gem). The results advanced knowledge about the cognitive mechanisms used by children in 811 
punishment type decisions in two ways. Firstly, Experiments 1-2 provided evidence suggesting 812 
that there is no separation between different moral domains when it comes to the link between 813 
transgression detection and punishment motivation – there was no clear overall tendency to make 814 
the punishment fit the crime by matching social ostracism to loyalty violations and matching 815 
economic punishment to fairness violations. Secondly, we found that although the basic motive to 816 
punish therefore appears moral-domain-general, inequality aversion can substantially modify 817 
children’s 3PP behaviour in terms of punishment type. Matching of the punishment to the crime 818 
was unambiguous only when the punishment could mitigate the crime (Experiment 1, gem fine for 819 
gem unfairness), which is consistent with children’s well known equalisation concerns 820 
(Gummerum & Chu, 2014; Gummerum et al., 2019; Jordan et al., 2014, Smith & Warneken 2016). 821 
Further, the only condition in which punitive action could correct the results of the transgression, 822 
by equalising the unfair resource distribution, was also the only condition in which 3PP severity 823 
did not decrease with age. Although the motive to punish severely in this context is apparently 824 
generally diminishing, the lack of change in this condition is consistent with children’s persistent 825 
motivations towards fairness throughout the studied age range (Shaw & Olson, 2012), if they are 826 
additionally using 3PP as an equalisation tool. This therefore additionally strengthens our general 827 




We now turn to our most unexpected and informative result – most children showed no 829 
enjoyment of 3PP, and even warning or pretending to punish was not enjoyed by most. 830 
Nonetheless, children did not show regret for their punishment decisions and even declared they 831 
would make the same decisions again. Thus, the lack of hedonic rewards brought about by 3PP 832 
makes it unlikely for retribution to be a primary motivator of the observed 3PP, contrary to our 833 
prediction. It remains to be clarified whether lack of 3PP-related enjoyment is generalisable to 834 
other punishment contexts, or whether retribution would play a more significant role in more 835 
naturalistic settings. However, the idea that children’s 3PP is not motivated by strong affective 836 
processes is consistent with findings of children’s increased physiological arousal in response to 837 
transgressions prior to their engaging in 2PP but not 3PP (Gummerum et al., 2019). There are 838 
therefore two plausible explanations for the very high levels of 3PP that were observed. Children 839 
may have been motivated by deterrence, or (especially given the demand characteristics of the 840 
experiment, i.e. taking the role of a referee) children may have thought it was their moral duty to 841 
punish misbehaving players. In other words, children’s punitive responses might have been at least 842 
partially motivated by the desire to conform to norms rather than to genuinely enforce moral 843 
standards of behaviour (Pedersen et al., 2018). A strong desire to conform would also be consistent 844 
with the relative lack of audience effects: perceived expectations to conform to the punishment 845 
norm might have already been close to ceiling in the No Audience condition. Importantly, note 846 
that operating according to perceived expectations is not necessarily the opposite of acting upon 847 
one’s internal motivations. Over development, the one tends often to become the other – that is 848 
what norm internalisation is (but see debate about the effects of role-taking on behavioural choices 849 
in experimental settings, Levitt & List, 2007 and List, 2007). 850 




likely aware they were in a testing situation rather than playing a game simply for its own sake. 852 
However, the demand characteristics in our experiments were nevertheless probably aligned with 853 
children’s perceptions of adults’ general expectations about 3PP, conferring some ecological 854 
validity to the situation. This claim is based on the facts that the majority of children did believe 855 
they refereed a game with real players, and that differences in behaviour were not detected in 856 
children who did not believe this. Importantly, the aim of our study was not to establish whether 857 
children punish in the absence of task demands. Our aim was rather to shed light on the cognitive 858 
and affective mechanisms governing children’s 3PP behaviour. In doing so, we created some task 859 
demands to maximise the rates of 3PP and potentially the variety of 3PP responses. We thus made 860 
a trade-off decision balancing the need of a naturalistic methodology against the need of obtaining 861 
a rich repertoire of children’s punitive reactions to better evaluate potential modulating factors of 862 
3PP. As our study was designed to test our research hypotheses rather than to mimic behavioural 863 
patterns in daily life (Pisor et al., 2019), it should not be used to provide estimates of children's 864 
3PP rates or decisions, in the real world. The frequency of 3PP behaviours, indeed, substantially 865 
differs when comparing experimental games data (like ours) to self-reports (Molho et al., 2020) or 866 
field experiments (Balafoutas et al., 2014). It is an open question the extent to which psychological 867 
mechanisms regulating 3PP are actually the same across different contexts (real life vs experiments 868 
laden with varying degrees of demand characteristics). 869 
A second important limitation of our experimental design is that a significant minority of 870 
children did not believe the moral scenarios they were refereeing had actually occurred. However, 871 
believability rates in our experiments might be an underestimate: we asked children about the 872 
believability of the set-up in quite a conservative manner, probably bringing doubts that children 873 




believability did not affect the key variables we focused on, future work should aim at increasing 875 
realism of experimental settings. Believability issues, as well as the demand characteristics implicit 876 
in our study, may be tackled by employing non-supervised computerised paradigms. This would 877 
enhance the ecological validity of the methodology even further, as young children nowadays are 878 
increasingly accustomed to playing computer games by themselves. Relatedly, in order to 879 
investigate audience effects on moral judgements and 3PP we manipulated the levels of 880 
observation children were subjected to. It is worth specifying there was no condition where 881 
children certainly felt entirely unobserved, since even in the No Audience condition the 882 
experimenter was still present. Furthermore, rather than measuring 3PP propensity in terms of 883 
punishment/no-punishment binary choices, 3PP was considered on a continuum of severity. 884 
Therefore, distinct punishment severity scales were adopted, one for each punishment type. It is 885 
currently unknown whether children interpreted the time-out and fine severity scales as equivalent. 886 
However, both in Experiment 1 and 2 (where the judgement scales used were different), 3PP 887 
severity was predicted by judgements of transgression severity, adding some validity to the 888 
punishment severity scales we used. Moreover, we measured emotional consequences of 3PP 889 
engagement only explicitly. The employment of a wider set of measures (self-reported emotion 890 
ratings, skin conductance responses, facial expressions) is thus advisable to provide a more 891 
comprehensive picture of how children experience enacting 3PP.  892 
Even though the literature on children’s punitive behaviour is growing (the number of directly 893 
relevant empirical papers has reached double digits in the last few years), there is still relatively 894 
little evidence speaking to children’s underlying motives for engaging in punishment. The finding 895 
that, at least in this context, retribution is unlikely to be an important motive for children’s 3PP 896 




clarifying the potential roles of deterrence and conformity motivations for children’s 3PP are now 898 
a priority. That multiple motivations may be involved is suggested by our conclusion that 3PP 899 
behaviour, although not generally chosen to match the specific transgression, can be modified by 900 
other related concerns such as resource equalisation. This further highlights the potential 901 
relationship between two important justice-related concerns: fairness in allocation of punishment 902 
and fairness in allocation of resources (Riedl et al. 2015; Smith & Warneken, 2016). 903 
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